

CONFIDENTIAL

Prod. 5m
Cross Ref. Prod. 5j.

IC 75-2516

Major General Lincoln D. Faurer, USAF
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Defense Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Linc:

We share your concern about the problem of warning to civil aviation. Indeed, though FAA and private airline communication links to aircraft are in much better shape than Hydrographic Office links to ships, there are a variety of questions concerning aircraft which need consideration. For example: What events should U. S. civil aircraft be warned of? If warned while still airborne, how should the aircraft react--turn back, land, avoid certain areas, or what? If essentially political events are involved, which agency of Government should deal with FAA? And what would be the role of NOIWON in all of this?

You may know that, because of sensitivities concerning Community relations with purely domestic agencies, we asked General Scowcroft in June to sponsor, on behalf of the NSC, an effort to compile a directory of the "National Nervous System" and to obtain information concerning operations centers associated with domestic agencies and departments. General Scowcroft agreed to do so and apparently planned through Mr. Richard Ober of the NSC staff to initiate a NSSM-type exercise for this purpose. Accordingly, I am forwarding your expression of concern to Mr. Ober.

In addition, if you wish, we could discuss this issue at our next meeting of the operations center officers at [] scheduled for 2/3 October. Perhaps you or your representatives could tell us if there are existing procedures for warning military aircraft which might prove instructive vis-a-vis the civil aircraft problem.

25X1

Distrib:

- 1 - Addressee
- 1 - D/DCI/IC

Sincerely,

1 - []
1 - []

/s/ Samuel V. Wilson

✓ 1 - IC/Registry

Samuel V. Wilson

1 - PRD Chron

Lieutenant General, USA

1 - PRD OC

Deputy to the DCI for the

1 - PRD Subject

Intelligence Community

Approved For Release 2006/07/03 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000800100005-5

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DCI/IC/PRD/[]/18 Sept 75/4445

25X1

25X1

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*Recd. 5-22
Cross Ref. Prod 5ij.*

IC 75-251

19 SEP 1975

Mr. Richard Ober
Director for Intelligence Coordination
National Security Council
Washington, D.C. 20506

Dear Dick:

The attached letter from General Faurer to me concerns a specific problem which falls within the "National Nervous System" account. We share General Faurer's apprehensions about procedures for warning civil aircraft via FAA, and we have let him know that we are relaying his letter to you. It may be that the Department of State could serve as a conduit to the FAA for warnings of a political nature (in the same way, perhaps, that State serves as the principal channel to the Hydrographic Office of the Defense Mapping Service for warnings of this character to the US merchant fleet).

All of this seems appropriate to your efforts to handle the problem of the warning activities of domestic agencies through a NSNM-type procedure.

Sincerely,

/s/ Samuel V. Wilson

Samuel V. Wilson
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community

Attachment:

General Faurer letter
of 2 September 1975

Distribution:

1 - Addressee w/att	1 - IC/Registry w/att
1 - D/DCI/IC "	1 - PRD Chron w/att
1 - [] "	1 - PRD Subject w/att
1 - []	1 - PRD/OC w/att
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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DCI/IC 75-3051

Prod. 6 m!
Cross Ref: Prod. 5

C-0028/VDIN

LTC Samuel V. Wilson, USA
Deputy to the Director for
Central Intelligence for
the Intelligence Community
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

2 SEP 1975

Dear Sam,

As you know, an ad hoc panel chaired by RADM Showers has been meeting periodically to identify procedural solutions to ensure the timely dissemination of special warning information to US flag merchant ships. As a corollary, the problem of warning civil aviation has been raised.

In an effort to clarify watchstanding instructions to the NMIC Alert Center, we have discovered that the civil air problem is somewhat fuzzy. Apparently, the Federal Aviation Administration is in charge, but their directive authority may be questionable, and, in any case, we can find no formalized guidance for the intelligence community to provide the FAA with an appropriate warning.

I believe that action should be initiated to formalize the flow of warning information from the intelligence community to US flag civil aircraft, and that the ICS is the appropriate agency to undertake such an effort. I note that the DCI post-mortem on the Mayaguez incident recommends action be taken in the case of aircraft responsibility; however, the "action under way" (p. 18) does not include the air problem. I am particularly anxious to publish instructions for DIA Alert Center personnel concerning the proper actions they should take in conjunction with other members of the community, but would like such directives to reflect the community position.

Sincerely,

LINCOLN D. FAURER
Major General, USAF
Deputy Director for Intelligence

Classified by-----DIN-----
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DECEMBER ...1981...

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

has reviewed and concurred in the present draft. He made some suggested changes in an earlier version (attached) which have now been included.

9/16
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

MEMORANDUM FOR: CH/PRD

Dick:

See attached comment from . Suggest you discuss this with him before sending to Hank & Sam. He has a pertinent input which may be helpful.

Al 9/15
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DRAFT/ []
16 September 1975

25X1

Major General Lincoln D. Faurer, USAF
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Defense Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Linc:

We share your concern about the problem of warning to civil aviation. Indeed, though FAA and private airline communication links to aircraft are in much better shape than Hydrographic Office links to ships, there are a variety of questions concerning aircraft which need consideration. For example: What events should US civil aircraft be warned of? If warned while still airborne, how should the aircraft react--turn back, land, avoid certain areas, or what? If essentially political events are involved, which agency of Government should deal with FAA? And what would be the role of NOIWON in all of this?

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

In addition, if you wish, we could discuss this issue at our next meeting of the operations center officers a scheduled for 25X1 2/3 October. Perhaps you or your representatives could tell us if there are existing procedures for warning military aircraft which might prove instructive vis-a-vis the civil aircraft problem.

Sincerely,

Samuel V. Wilson
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DRAFT [REDACTED]
15 September 1975

25X1

Mr. Richard Ober
Director for Intelligence Coordination
National Security Council
Washington, D. C. 20506

Dear Dick:

The attached letter from General Faurer to me concerns a specific problem which falls within the "National Nervous System" account. We share General Faurer's apprehensions about procedures for warning civil aircraft via FAA, and we have let him know that we are relaying his letter to you. It may be that the Department of State could serve as a conduit to the FAA for warnings of a political nature (in the same way, perhaps, that State serves as the principal channel to the Hydrographic Office of the Defense Mapping Service for warnings of this character to the US merchant fleet).

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Sincerely,

Samuel V. Wilson
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community

Attachment:
Gen. Faurer's ltr of 2 Sep 75

Of what type events should
US flag civil aircraft be
warned?

How will they effectively
receive such warnings?

- i.e., while airborne?

What will they be expected
to do about such warnings
-- avoid, turn back, land?

Would warnings be
primarily air navigation
hazards, or political-type
situations? If latter,
State must play the lead

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DRAFT/
15 September 1975

25X1

Major General Lincoln D. Faurer, USAF
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Defense Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Linc:

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and private *airline*
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shape than Hydrographic Office links to ships, there are a variety of
questions concerning aircraft which need consideration. For example:
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areas, or what? If essentially political events are involved, which agency
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NOIWON in all of this?

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for this purpose. Accordingly, I am forwarding your expression of
concern to Mr. Ober.

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No + so.
done.

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

13 JUN 1975

Intelligence Community Staff

DCI/IC 75-1525

Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft, USAF
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Brent:

In a letter to the President on 23 May 1975, Mr. Colby addressed his continuing efforts to improve intelligence community procedures to support the National Security Council in the light of the Mayaguez experience. In the attachment to that letter, reference was made to a better understanding of our own "national nervous system."

Our purpose in writing to you at this time is to enlist your help in obtaining the necessary information to create a national nervous system directory. Its use can improve lateral communications among the watch officer community and will materially assist us in disseminating foreign intelligence promptly to selected key officials in incipient crisis situations. This directory would identify major watch centers of U.S. government agencies (intelligence, military, diplomatic and domestic) both in the U.S. and overseas. It would briefly describe their functions and interconnections, and it would list phone numbers and message addresses.

The Intelligence Community Staff took a first step in this direction last fall by issuing a "Crisis Management Communication Card," which lists 29 of the 24-hour watch centers in the Washington area (copy attached). We would now like to expand this effort. However, we have refrained from collecting this kind of information about centers associated with domestic agencies and departments because we did not want to run the risk that such an undertaking might be cited (mistakenly) as an example of DCI intrusion in domestic affairs.

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To avoid such a misunderstanding, we believe that collecting the directory information should be approved in advance and sponsored at your level. The Intelligence Community Staff can provide guidance on the kinds of information needed and the formats for collection and updating the information, and it can assemble and produce the end product. Displays would be placed in watch centers so that their staffs will be reminded continually of the nature and extent of the national nervous system.

To get such an effort underway, we need your approval and your designation of some instrumentality to work with us and to serve as the intermediary and mechanism for collecting this information, particularly from domestic agencies and departments. Your guidance is requested.

Sincerely,

/s/ Samuel V. Wilson

Samuel V. Wilson
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community

Enclosure

Crisis Management Communication Card

25X1
25X1 DCI/IC/IHC/NCF/ [] (11 Jun 75)

Distribution:

- 25X1
- O - Addressee
 - 1 - D/DCI/IC
 - 1 - PRD []
 - 1 - IC Registry
 - ① - IHC Subject
 - 1 - IHC Reading

9.51

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SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET	
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP M			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	AD/DCI/IC		
2	D/DCI/IC	9/18	W/L
3	PRD		
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6			
	ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
	CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
Remarks: <p style="margin-left: 40px;">Attached is <u>draft</u> response to Gen. Faurer's memo on the problem of warning civil aviation, as requested. Have done letters for both Faurer and Ober. Ready to discuss at your convenience.</p>			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 80px; height: 30px; margin: 0 auto;"></div>			DATE
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			
<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100px; height: 30px; margin: 0 auto;"></div>			15 Sep 75
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15 SEP 1975 9 20

IC REGISTRY ROUTING SLIP

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2 AD/DCI/IC	JW	9/5
1 EO	M	9/5
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PD/Plans		
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IC Registry		
ACTION OFFICE		
SUSPENSE DATE 16 Sep 75		
IC Staff received 1 cys - furn offices circled.		

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1-2+3

Gen. Faurer has written the DDCIC concerning the follow-on actions to the Magagnee Port Mortam. Specifically he points out a problem concerning the alerting of civil aircraft and suggests ICS as the appropriate agency to insure the proper flow of information from the community to the users. He plans to issue instructions to the DIA Alert Center but before doing so would like to know the community position.

I have sent a copy of this to [redacted] who is drafting a suggested response.

Some comments and questions from [redacted] are on the left

We will want to discuss when draft response is ready.

W/9-12-75